Neurorights versus Externalism about Mental Content: Characterizing the 'Harm' of Neurotechnological Mind Reading

Abstract

Neurorights are widely discussed as a means of protecting phenomena like cognitive liberty and freedom of thought. This article is especially interested in example cases where these protections are sought in light of fast-paced developments in neurotechnologies that appear capable of reading the mind in some significant sense. While it is prudent to take care and seek to protect the mind from prying, questions remain over the kinds of claims that prompt concerns over mind reading. The nature of these claims should influence how exactly rights may or may not offer justifiable solutions. Overall, the exploration of neurotechnological mind reading questions here will come in terms of philosophical accounts of mental content and neuroreductionism. The contribution will be to present a contextualization of questions arising from 'mind-reading' neurotechnology, and appraisal of if or how neurorights respond to them.