Evolutionary game analysis on last mile delivery resource integration—exploring the behavioral strategies between logistics service providers, property service companies and customers

Abstract

As resource integration plays a significant part in improving operational efficiency in the last mile delivery industry, there is an increasing popularity for logistics service providers (LSPs) to collaborate with property service companies (PSCs). Based on the evolutionary game theory, considering the dual role of PSCs when collaborating with LSPs, a trilateral evolutionary game model between PSCs, LSPs, and customers (Cs) is established to analyze the strategic choices and explore the influencing factors on the tripartite strategy. The results show that (1) There are optimal profit allocation coefficients and cost‐sharing coefficients to cause the system to reach a steady state. (2) The integration cost between LSPs and PSCs and the home delivery cost inhibit the strategic integration of the two enterprises. (3) PSCs are more sensitive to their benefits and costs than LSPs in the process of resource integration. (4) More precisely evaluating their potential loss caused by tem-porary integration will help the tripartite to make a more scientific choice of strategic behavior. (5) The increase of community premium income helps to improve the enthusiasm of Cs supporting strategic integration. (6) The behavior and decision‐making choices of the three game players affect each other in the last mile delivery resource integration. (7) The indirect benefits, such as advertising during their integration, play a positive role. Finally, the MATLAB2020a software is applied to sim-ulate and analyze the impact of key factors on strategy evolution, and we propose several useful suggestions to promote the development of last mile delivery resource integration.