The game analysis of low carbon supply chain emission reduction considering channel power under the concern of fairness

Abstract

The emission reduction strategies of different channel power structures is studied under the fair, neutral and fair concerns of manufacturers, and compares the emission reduction levels, wholesale and retail prices, and the changes and differences in the profits of supply chain members under various circumstances. The research shows that the increase of emission reduction cost factor is not conducive to the improvement of emission reduction level, price and profit. The profit level of manufacturer under the manufacturer-led structure is not conducive to the manufacturer-led structure due to other structures, but is conducive to the improvement of the profit level of manufacturer under other structures. Manufacturer's equity concern behaviour is beneficial to the improvement of manufacturer's utility, in which the equity concern factor should be kept at a certain level under Nash vertical structure. Equity concerns and emission reduction strategies under decentralized decision-making are not conducive to the improvement of the overall supply chain effectiveness.