Independent directors in Sweden and their influence on earnings through accrual and real activities management

Abstract

The dominating perspective grounded in agency theory predicts that independent boards are more effective in monitoring and thereby reducing earnings management, yet the extant empirical evidence is inconclusive. We nuance the relationship between board independence and earnings management by introducing two additional theories that explain independent directors’ role on the board: the theory of personal dependence and praxis theory. According to personal dependence theory, the influence of independent directors on earnings management is a function of their competitiveness in the labor market, whereas the praxis theory attributes directors’ influence to the influence of the dominant coalition. We focus on two dimensions of earnings management  accrual and real activities management, and account for both direction and magnitude of directors’ influence. Through an empirical test on 148 Swedish corporations from 2017, our findings indicate that the presence of independent directors may not necessarily reduce earnings management. Instead, independent directors may be subject to multiple and sometimes conflicting task demands which differently influence both magnitude and direction of earnings management. Implications for our understanding of the role of independent directors and their influence on corporations are presented