Signaling Commitment via Insincere Conformity: A New Take on the Persistence of Unpopular Norms

Abstract

I develop and test a theory to address instances of “visibly unpopular” norms—norms that are widely seen as neither collectively optimal nor enjoyable to conform with. Based on 76 interviews with Korean professionals engaging with a norm pertaining to excessive drinking at after-hours business gatherings (hoesik)—widely recognized as undesirable and disapproved of by both individuals and groups—I find that conformity serves as an effective signal of commitment to exchange partners not despite of but precisely because of the conformist’s visible aversion. Insofar as typical conformity with visibly unpopular norms appears “insincere” as such, conformity may continue. Vignette experiments further validate such insincere conformity’s signaling value. The implication is that despite the prevailing notion that norms persist because they promote collectively optimal solutions or are perceived as such, norms widely acknowledged as individually and collectively suboptimal may still endure.