LIMITED DELEGATION AND FIRM CONTROL:A PRINCIPAL-AGENT ACCOUNT OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) DECISION-MAKING ON ZIMBABWE’S LAND ISSUE

Abstract

This paper accounts for Southern African Development Community (SADC) decision-making on Zimbabwe’s land issue from the year2000 onwards. Guided by the principal-agent model, this paperargues that the delegation and control dynamics emerging fromSADC’s principal-agent institutional structure and relationshipsshaped the regional organisation’s (RO’s) decisions on Zimbabwe’sland issue. This study adopted a qualitative methodology to explorethis proposition utilising both primary and secondary sources of data.Primary data were collected through semi-structured key informantinterviews and official documents such as SADC communiqués, while secondary data were gathered from published books, journal articles,newspaper articles and other related materials. Thematic analysis wasthe method used to analyse the data. The findings revealed that themember states (principal) limited the delegation of decision-makingauthority to the SADC (agent) and the principal’s firm control of theagent were key factors shaping SADC outcomes on Zimbabwe’sland issue. These principal-agent dynamics enabled member statesto control SADC’s decisions on Zimbabwe’s land issue. Conversely,there was also opportunistic agent behaviour that resulted in decisionsthat injured the principal’s interests. Such decisions included theTribunal’s fateful ruling on Zimbabwe’s land reform programme.Overall, this paper contributes to the existing body of knowledge byre-contextualising the principal-agent model in a new setting, whichis SADC decision-making on Zimbabwe’s land issue