Anti-Access Strategies in the Pacific: The United States and China

Abstract

This article reviews the elements of anti-access strategies the United States and China might use in the event the latter begins to project power out from the South China Sea region. Requirements for the US Army to plan for land-based forces and the US Navy to contain China effectively in the first and second island chains are also provided. The idea that China will employ an anti-access strategy against the United States has become conventional wisdom. 1 Most sources apply the term anti-access/area denial-or more frequently its acronym "A2/AD"-to describe the type of campaign China would conduct. The concept also corresponds to China's goal of being able to win a regional war under high-technology conditions and "winning informationized local wars." 2 Indeed, for the past three decades, China has invested in combat systems-sensors, weapons, and battle management-optimized for an anti-access campaign against America's forward-based forces projecting power in the region. Such systems include satellites for covering maritime areas, backscatter radars, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) with anti-ship targeting capabilities, long-range cruise missiles, land-based maritime-capable bombers and attack aircraft, attack submarines, and advanced naval mines. 3 Additionally, China has built artificial island bases over the awash features of the South China Sea. To be sure, China has also invested in ground-combat systems and amphibious assault capabilities, which would likely be necessary for a forcible annexation of Taiwan. But the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has prioritized its tremendous growth in military spending to its navy, air force, and rocket forces, while cutting army manpower.