Sentencing Elsewhere: Structuring Sentencing Discretion in Post-communist Europe

Abstract

Former socialist European countries (FSECs) have largely been overlooked in the scholarly debate on sentencing disparities and structuring sentencing discretion. The article addresses this gap by analysing the specific sentencing characteristics in FSECs, which differ from those in their Western counterparts. Specifically, FSECs place greater emphasis on the principle of individualisation and exhibit distrust towards the executive branch. Whilst recent studies have documented important unwarranted disparities in FSECs, scholarly and professional debates on sentencing issues in these countries have been rare and often superficial to date. In this paper, we describe the specifics of sentencing in FSEC, emphasising the broad discretion provided to sentencers, the lack of interest from sentencing stakeholders, and the frequent neglect of procedural factors influencing sentencing. Drawing on existing scholarship and empirical evidence, we put forward general principles for structuring sentencing discretion in a manner specific to FSEC. We identify key actors who might provide guidance and discuss how our suggestions might be implemented in practice.