Constitutional Symbolism in the Shadow of the Common Good

Abstract

This paper aims to clarify the concept of the symbolic constitution and to explain one of its most significant functions: the representation of political unity in complex societies. Section B briefly outlines the concept of the symbolic constitution which informs the arguments of the paper. The next two sections proceed hermeneutically through critical engagements with (i) Martin Loughlin's recent analysis of the symbolic constitution within an ideology-critique of neo-liberal constitutionalism (ii) Niklas Luhmann's account of the role of symbolic constitutionalism in concealing the function of the modern constitution as a structural coupling between the political and legal sub-systems. Section E then considers the relationship between the symbolic constitution and an alternative traditional concept for the representation of political unity: the common good. I argue that the symbolic constitution is both (i) a placeholder which speaks to the abiding relevance of the common good (ii) a symptom of the decline of its preconditions.