Rights of Nature Through a Legal Expressivist Lens: Legal Recognition of Non-Anthropocentric Values

Abstract

The shortcomings of existing legal tools to abate species extinctions and habitat losses raise the attractiveness of recognizing rights of nature (RoN), in effect granting legal standing directly to non-human entities and collectives. RoN have been recognized in several domestic legislations and attract increasing popularity and enthusiasm. Yet, from an analytical and general perspective RoN rely on a contentious relation between concepts such as intrinsic value and interests, respectively, as justifying RoN. Consequently, a general analytical defense of RoN has not been provided and recognition hitherto has been constrained to the contingent factors of domestic legislations. Here, I will provide an examination of RoN by way of expressive theories of law where law expresses (some) ethical values. Expressive theories of law have not previously been related to RoN. I will examine whether such theories have the potential of defending RoN as rights that legislatures have strong general reasons to recognize. The examination of RoN through the lens of expressivist legal theories provide a better understanding of RoN, and the analytical and conceptual commitments they presuppose, including the relation between ethics and law and the values underpinning RoN to be expressed by law.