Abstract
We present a new framework for proving fully black-box separations and lower bounds. We prove a general theorem that facilitates the proofs of fully black-box lower bounds from a one-way function (OWF). Loosely speaking, our theorem says that in order to prove that a fully black-box construction does not securely construct a cryptographic primitive Q (e.g., a pseudo-random generator or a universal one-way hash function) from a OWF, it is enough to come up with a large enough set of functions and a parameterized oracle (i.e., an oracle that is defined for every f ε{0,1} n → {0,1} n ) such that breaks the security of the construction when instantiated with f and the oracle satisfies two local properties. Our main application of the theorem is a lower bound of Ω(n/log(n)) on the number of calls made by any fully black-box construction of a universal one-way hash function (UOWHF) from a general one-way function. The bound holds even when the OWF is regular, in which case it matches to a recent construction of Barhum and Maurer [4]. © 2013 International Association for Cryptologic Research.
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CITATION STYLE
Barhum, K., & Holenstein, T. (2013). A cookbook for black-box separations and a recipe for UOWHFs. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7785 LNCS, pp. 662–679). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36594-2_37
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