Abstract
We presume a background theory which allows for indeterminacy of states of affairs involving objects, extending even to indeterminacy of identity between objects. A sentence reporting such an indeterminate state of affairs lacks truth-value. We extend this to a theory of sets, similar to ZFU, in which membership in, and identity between, sets may also be indeterminate. © 1999 by the University of Notre Dame. All rights reserved.
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CITATION STYLE
APA
Woodruff, P., & Parsons, T. (1999). Set theory with indeterminacy of identity. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 40(4), 473–495. https://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1012429714
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