Basic Level Categorisation and the Law

Abstract

This article probes the usefulness of the notion of basic level categorisation for legal theory. Basic level categorisation is the central part of the vertical dimension of Eleanor Rosch’s prototype theory. It addresses the question about the various levels of abstraction at which humans can categorise the world. Extensive anthropological, psychological and linguistic research has proven that there is a preferable level of abstraction, namely the basic level, at which primary categorical cuts of the perceived world are made. Three areas of legal theory are identified when applying these findings. The first is the area of visualisation of legal rules. The notion of basic level categories addresses some of the known problems of discrepancies between the visualisation of a rule and its verbal description. The second is the area of statutory interpretation. Many famous cases of interpretive doubts are resolved around superordinate categories in statutory language. Categories of this level of abstraction are less contrastive than basic level categories, thus resulting in more potential for borderline cases and more reliance on functional methods in their classification. The third is the area of legislative drafting. The way in which the law categorises the world often invalidates two principles of categorisation identified by Rosch, namely cognitive economy and perceived world structure. In order to successfully enhance the comprehensibility of legal texts, it is necessary to go beyond the purely linguistic level and address the problem of legal categorisation.