A Comparative Analysis of Cryptographic Techniques for Privacy Preservation in Blockchain-Based Dispute Resolution

Abstract

Digital innovations have profoundly altered the landscape of remote collaboration, yet these innovations frequently lead to conflicts that necessitate robust and fair decentralized decision-making systems.These conflicts occur either because they are not yet regulated by law, or because they arise from disputes associated with onchain applications, or simply because they are easier to resolve online. Public blockchains, characterized by their transparency and immutability, present viable solutions for these systems. However, the very transparency that makes blockchains appealing also introduces significant privacy concerns, as the traceability of transactions can jeopardize the anonymity of participants. Although users can maintain a degree of pseudoanonymity through cryptographic addresses, their activities remain publicly accessible, which poses considerable risks if their identities are uncovered. To mitigate these challenges, various cryptographic methods, including stealth addresses and zero-knowledge proofs (zk-SNARKs), have been developed to bolster transaction privacy. This paper distinguishes itself by offering an in-depth examination of these privacy-enhancing techniques, emphasizing their integration within blockchain environments, as well as their scalability and programmability. Additionally, we address key limitations, such as the balance between privacy and computational complexity, along with the interoperability issues that arise among privacy-centric protocols. By providing a comparative analysis and investigating future research avenues, this paper contributes valuable perspectives on reconciling privacy and transparency in decentralized collaboration frameworks.