‘Revolutionary Taxation’ and the Logistical and Strategic Dilemmas of the Maoist Insurgency in the Philippines1

Abstract

In recent years, Maoist insurgents in the Philippines have intensified their extortion activities through ‘revolutionary taxation’ and through the collection of ‘permit to campaign’/‘permit to win’ (PTC/PTW) fees during elections. This article examines why the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), through its guerrilla force, the New People’s Army (NPA), has resorted to, and put greater emphasis on, ‘revolutionary’ extortion. It analyzes whether greed rather than grievance has now become the main driving factor behind the Maoist insurgency, and what the turn to larger scale extortion indicates about the CPP-NPA’s logistical situation and its revolutionary strategy. The author argues that the intensification of revolutionary extortion has been brought about by the decline, uncertainty or political indefensibility of other revenue sources, and by favourable factors such as high levels of electoral violence and the mining boom. Despite the turn to extortion, the CPP-NPA has not degenerated into banditry and it continues to be an ideologically motivated revolutionary force. Rather than demonstrating the renewed strength of the Maoist insurgency, however, the stepped-up extortion activities are showing up the insurgents’ serious logistical problems, and continuing strategic dilemmas.