The right to the truth in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: An analysis from the perspective of theories of justice

Abstract

The article analyses the right to the truth in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) in the light of theories of justice. The first part argues that, although the concept of transitional justice cannot be assimilated to any existing theory of justice, it can be defined as a multidimensional concept that combines various elements of those theories. After analysing the extent to which these elements are reflected in the right to the truth defined in the jurisprudence of the IACtHR, the article emphasises some limits of the Court’s conceptualisation, especially the fact that it ignores the procedural dimension of justice. Therefore, the conclusion makes the case for democratic deliberation, which invites us to rethink the role of courts in the construction of a narrative about the past.