How to Be a Responsible Scientist. The Virtues in Max Weber’s Appeal to Scientists

Abstract

In Science as a Profession and Vocation, Max Weber presents a clear task to scientists: he claims that they have the responsibility to present uncomfortable knowledge to politicians, students and others to prompt them to reconsider their value judgments. This clear appeal is a welcome message in the current debates on the social and political role of scientists. It is especially interesting because it is at odds with acclaimed ideas about the role of scientists, such as those of Pielke, Flyvbjerg or Kitcher. Unfortunately, Weber’s sociological work, although it reflects this appeal to scientists in many respects, does provide a normative support for it. This article argues that a virtue ethical framework can be integrated into Weber’s position to strengthen the appeal for the scientist’s responsibility. I show that the obstacles to such an integration can be overcome by following MacIntyre’s modernized version of virtue ethics. The combination of Weber’s appeal and MacIntyre’s virtue ethics offers a well-founded position that is critical of current acclaimed positions on the political and societal role of the scientist and that provides a promising perspective in times of a looming fact-free politics.