Design and Selection of Pharmaceutical Innovation Incentive Policies: Subsidy or Inclusion in Health Insurance Plan

Abstract

A critical problem plaguing regulators in promoting pharmaceutical innovation is to design and select efficient incentive policies. In this study, we develop a stylized model comprising a regulator and two representative drug producers to evaluate the effects of three incentive policies: Innovation subsides, inclusion new drugs in the health insurance plan, and the combination of the above two policies (also called hybrid policy). Our analysis shows that innovation subsidies and inclusion of new drugs in the health insurance plan can both promote pharmaceutical innovation, but their incentive effects vary in different policy objectives. Specifically, if the regulator aims to improve patient welfare, he should incorporate new drugs into the health insurance plan to expand the accessibility of new drug when the copayment level is low. However, if the regulator aims to improve social welfare, he should choose innovation subsidies when the copayment level is high, and the hybrid policy when the copayment level is low. In particular, with a sufficiently low copayment level, the hybrid policy allows the new drug producer, patients and the regulator to achieve Pareto improvement due to a lower regulator’s innovation subsidy expenditure, higher profits of the new drug producer and consumer surplus.