What the Double Empathy Problem Is (and Is Not)

Abstract

We reassert the Double Empathy Problem (DEP) as a sociological account of autistic-non-autistic (and more broadly, between individuals with differing dispositions) interaction, rather than a social-cognitive theory of autism. The DEP reframes communicative breakdowns as relational rather than solely due to autistic deficits, countering harmful deficit-based theories of autism that rest on weak evidence. Evaluating the DEP solely through positivist social-cognitive frameworks risks undermining the DEP’s original epistemological stance as a sociological and critical lens. We clarify the probabilistic framing of the DEP to emphasize that misunderstandings between autistic and non-autistic people shift with context and power. This framing invites applied inquiry into methods for increasing mutual understanding. Importantly, there is growing evidence in favor of such a probabilistic DEP, whereas there are serious validity and evidentiary concerns surrounding traditional deficit-based social-cognitive theories. By centering autistic perspectives, we argue that the DEP can promote ethical research agendas that integrate rigorous, context-sensitive methods to advance a relational, power-aware autism science that benefits the autistic community on its own terms.