The End of an Era for Foreign Lobbying? The Emergence of Foreign Transparency Laws in Washington, Canberra and Brussels

Abstract

The lobbying of other countries' political and legal elites has emerged as a security risk globally. The securitization of foreign lobbying has prompted the adoption of specialized legal regimes, that is, foreign transparency laws, to enable the scrutiny of how foreign actors lobby. This article analyzes and compares such laws in the United States, Australia and the European Union (EU) with respect to three issues: (1) the definition of a foreign actor, (2) the definition of a type of foreign lobbying and (3) the definition of a protected normative good. While the impetus to legislative reform has often rested on a concern with authoritarian governments, the foreign transparency laws capture diverse kinds of foreign influence activities and actors. They may thus catch in their nets actors or types of influence never intended to be caught in the first place. This has particularly significant implications for the EU as a polity and foreign policy actor.