Abstract
This article examines the conditions for responsibilizing corporations. When we responsibilize an agent, we hold him responsible for his choices – although we are aware that he is not yet fully fit to be held responsible – in order to induce in him the relevant characteristics for being fit to be held responsible at a later time. I find that the conditions of responsibilizability are not identical to the conditions for responsibilization we usually and reasonably apply. Typically, we only responsibilize agents who do not only meet the comparably weak conditions of responsibilizability, but who also fulfil additional criteria, as for example having demonstrated first signs of normative reasoning. I argue that corporations do not only meet the minimum threshold of responsibilizability, but also a comparably higher threshold, which allows us to engage in particularly effective forms of responsibilization. Basically, we may permissibly responsibilize the overwhelming majority of corporations in the same way parents responsibilize their growing children
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Mildenberger, C. D. (2019). Corporate responsibilization. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 36(1), 93–92. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12290
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