Deterrence in the Israeli-Iranian Strategic Standoff

  • Terrill W
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Abstract

Forecasts a failure in current US & international efforts -- be they sanctions or air strikes -- to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Discussion opens with a look at Israel's security concerns & continues with an examination of ideological & practical constraints on a future Iranian attack on Israel in all but the most extreme circumstances: (1) collateral damage to Palestinians & Arab/Muslim neighbors; (2) a massive Israeli strategic force retaliation; & (3) an expanding Israeli missile defense program backed by a strong civil defense program. Attention is then given to the likely consequences of a preemptive attack on the Iranian nuclear program. Ultimately, it is suggested that increased Israeli deterrence capabilities & a US diplomatic engagement with Iran are seen as fruitful options. Adapted from the source document.

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APA

Terrill, W. A. (2009). Deterrence in the Israeli-Iranian Strategic Standoff. The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, 39(1). https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.2466

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