Disguised Repression: Targeting Opponents with Nonpolitical Crimes to Undermine Dissent

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Abstract

Why do authoritarian regimes charge political opponents with nonpolitical crimes when they can levy charges directly related to opponents’ political activism? We argue that doing so disguises political repression and undermines the moral authority of opponents, minimizing backlash and mobilization. To test this argument, we conduct a survey experiment, which shows that disguised repression decreases perceptions of dissidents’ morality, decreases people’s willingness to engage in dissent on behalf of the dissident, and increases support for repression of the dissident. We then assess the external validity of the argument by analyzing millions of Chinese social media posts made before and after a large crackdown of vocal government critics in China in 2013. We find that individuals with larger online followings are more likely to be charged with nonpolitical crimes, and those charged with nonpolitical crimes are less likely to receive public sympathy and support.

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Pan, J., Xu, X., & Xu, Y. (2026). Disguised Repression: Targeting Opponents with Nonpolitical Crimes to Undermine Dissent. Journal of Politics, 88(1), 282–298. https://doi.org/10.1086/734267

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