Intelligence warning in the Ukraine war, Autumn 2021–Summer 2022

Abstract

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is a unique case study of the use of warning intelligence. The article shows that whilst Russia’s invasion has sparked a wave of interest on aspects of intelligence, including the use of open source and ‘prebuttal’, the fundamentals of warning intelligence–the forewarning of major threats in a timely manner so policymakers and officials can respond–remain the same as they have always have. The article also suggests that whilst both sides of the conflict had intelligence advantages at the start, intelligence only becomes a significant force multiplier if the consumer sees value in it and uses it. For Russia, significant intelligence advantages were not fully exploited with the effect that they lost the initiative. Ukraine, whilst initially taken by surprise at the tactical and operational level, was able to use intelligence to its advantage. This, we argue, had long lasting implications for the course of the first period of the conflict.