The Role of Dark Money Disclosure on Candidate Evaluations and Viability

Abstract

The post-Citizens United election environment has allowed more actors with deep pockets to sponsor political advertising, exposing many voters to a barrage of ads from a multitude of new groups. Particular concern has been focused on so-called "dark money" groups, which have the ability to solicit unlimited and undisclosed donations - most of which pay for television ads. Research suggests that unknown group-sponsored ads are more effective than ads sponsored by candidates. This analysis examines whether the effectiveness of unfamiliar dark-money ads can be mitigated by disclosing to viewers that the ad was paid for by a "dark money" group. To understand the impact of these factors, we conducted a series of experiments that manipulated the involvement of the groups and whether the groups were specifically partisan in nature. We find that, in the absence of a partisan cue, disclosing that a candidate benefits from dark money tends to reduce support for that candidate. When partisan cues are given, however, people "punish" candidates of the opposing party.