Special Issue: Regulation of Corporate Disclosure

Abstract

1 Motivation The information provided in corporate disclosures is a key contributor to corporate transparency. Firms provide these disclosures either voluntarily-when they consider them privately net-beneficial-or under mandatory requirements-when the information is intended to serve a larger objective. This Special Issue on "Regulation of Corporate Disclosure" focuses on questions related to mandatory disclosure. Corporate disclosures are financial or non-financial in nature. Financial corporate disclosure regulation is continuously being developed by national (e. g., the U.S. FASB) and supranational standard setters (e. g., the IASB) as well as other policy makers. These bodies are the target of active political lobbying by diverse constituents. Perhaps signaling perceived shortcomings of regulated financial reporting, a growing body of literature documents the rise of non-GAAP or alternative performance measures, by which firms complement their published financial statements (for a recent survey, see, for example, Black et al. 2018). Regulators, including the SEC and ESMA, have seen a need to place restrictions on firms' leeway to pub