From a punitive to a bargaining model of sanctions: Lessons from Iraq

Abstract

This article explores the effectiveness of the longest, most comprehensive, and most severe multilateral sanctions imposed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council against Iraq in 1990. It provides a different perspective with regard to the significance of sanctions in general, and against Iraq in particular. In contrast to the traditional use of the "punitive model" of sanctions, which mandated full compliance without reciprocating, this study offers a "bargaining model" framework that focuses on the process of negotiation and concessions for partial compliance. It claims that a decade of multilateral punitive sanctions against Iraq has led to some Iraqi compliance and the partial fulfillment of many of the UN's cease-fire objectives. But the failure of the UN to use the bargaining model to reciprocate Iraq squandered opportunities for additional Iraqi cooperation, and generated dynamics of deepening distrust and animosity made a negotiated solution more difficult and war a reality. © 2005 International Studies Association.