An improved authenticated key agreement protocol for telecare medicine information system

Abstract

In telecare medicine information systems (TMIS), identity authentication of patients plays an important role and has been widely studied in the research field. Generally, it is realized by an authenticated key agreement protocol, and many such protocols were proposed in the literature. Recently, Zhang et al. pointed out that Islam et al.’s protocol suffers from the following security weaknesses: (1) Any legal but malicious patient can reveal other user’s identity; (2) An attacker can launch off-line password guessing attack and the impersonation attack if the patient’s identity is compromised. Zhang et al. also proposed an improved authenticated key agreement scheme with privacy protection for TMIS. However, in this paper, we point out that Zhang et al.’s scheme cannot resist off-line password guessing attack, and it fails to provide the revocation of lost/stolen smartcard. In order to overcome these weaknesses, we propose an improved protocol, the security and authentication of which can be proven using applied pi calculus based formal verification tool ProVerif.