Lobbying venue selection under separation of powers and resource constraints

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Abstract

Prior work examines how organization resources and types shape venue selection strategies. Both Congress and executive branch agencies can change policy, so interest groups must consider which of these venues to lobby on a given issue. We argue that factors in the political environment—venues’ issue priorities and the power of groups’ allies in a venue—influence how groups with different resource constraints select lobbying venues. Examining over one million issue-level lobbying disclosures filed between 2008 and 2016, we find that low-resource groups strategically lobby the venue(s) controlled by partisan allies and respond to the government’s and public’s issue priorities. Meanwhile, high-resource groups more often lobby all venues relevant to their issues regardless of the political environment, especially on issues gaining significant attention within government but not in the public. Our findings suggest that separation of powers provides high-resource groups more venues to lobby for favored policies. Conversely, low-resource groups strategically only lobby venues they have the potential to influence.

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APA

Gause, L. G., & Lorenz, G. M. (2024). Lobbying venue selection under separation of powers and resource constraints. Interest Groups and Advocacy, 13(2), 73–95. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41309-024-00202-0

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