Western Estimates of Russian Military Capabilities and the Invasion of Ukraine

Abstract

The poor performance of the Russian military during the invasion of Ukraine came as a surprise to many in the West. This prompted a debate about why Russian capabilities had been overestimated. Fingers were pointed at the work of Western military analysts who, in the eyes of some critics, had based their estimates almost entirely on numbers and technology, resulting in mistaken predictions of a quick and decisive Russian victory. It has since been suggested that changes to the practices of Western military analysis are required if similar future failures are to be avoided. This article takes stock of this debate, proposing that the reasons for Western overestimates of Russian military capabilities and the lessons to be learned from this are far more complex than suggested by the critics. Discussing the political nature of military assessments and defense debates, the problems inherent in military analysis, and the difficulties associated with predicting outcomes in war, it concludes that laying blame for overestimates of Russian military power on Western experts is a fallacy. Expectations of achieving accurate future military assessments by refining the analytical base need to be tempered.