Free Will and Advances in Cognitive Science

  • Perlovsky L
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Abstract

Free will is fundamental to morality, intuition of self, and normal functioning of the society. However, science does not provide a clear logical foundation for this idea. This paper considers the fundamental scientific argument against free will, called reductionism, and explains the reasons for choosing dualism against monism. Then, the paper summarizes unexpected conclusions from recent discoveries in cognitive science. Classical logic turns out not to be the fundamental mechanism of mind. It is replaced by dynamic logic. Mathematical and experimental evidence are considered conceptually. Dynamic logic counters logical arguments for reductionism. Contemporary science of mind is not reducible; free will can be scientifically accepted along with scientific monism.

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APA

Perlovsky, L. (2012). Free Will and Advances in Cognitive Science. Open Journal of Philosophy, 02(01), 32–37. https://doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2012.21005

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