Leader security and hedging in the era of great power rivalry: responses of the Philippines and Singapore

Abstract

As great power competition escalates, secondary states may find their hedging strategies encounter greater systemic and domestic challenges. Existing literature suggests that competing great powers exert more pressure on hedgers, pushing them to choose a side. Nevertheless, in the real world, the sustainability of hedging varies across countries. In a departure from previous studies that emphasize systemic pressure, this article highlights the domestic pressure decision-makers face. It argues that the public prefers a consistent foreign policy strategy and is likely to be skeptical of hedging that contains contradictory security, economic, and political policies. Nevertheless, leaders serve as a transmission belt between systemic and domestic pressure at one end and foreign strategy at the other. Specifically, leaders with a solid support base at home enjoy greater autonomy in foreign policymaking and have a better chance of maintaining an intense hedging strategy. On the contrary, insecure leaders are more likely to cater to the public and adopt a more consistent foreign strategy, which implies the breakdown of hedging. This theoretical framework is illustrated with two cases: the China strategies of the Philippines and Singapore.