Parlasul, um novo ator no processo decisório do mercosul?

Abstract

The participation of the Mercosur Parliament (Parlasur) in the regional decision-making is legally restricted. Parlasur's attributions are limited and include, for instance, the elaboration of bills and recommendations to be sent to superior organs. This paper analyses if and in which manner Parlasur uses these competences to influence regional decisions. We argue that there are formal and informal mechanisms which, even limited, would allow Parlasur to intervene in the debates which take place within decisional organs. In order to evaluate wheter agenda-setting is a parliamentary power in Mercosur and if it is effective, we proceed to a quali-quantitative analysis of the recommendations sent by Parlasur to the Common Market Council (CMC). After establishing a typology of the recommendations sent by Parlasur to CMC between 2007 and 2010, we evaluate CMC's response rate (quantitatively) and CMC's manifestations on Parlasur's positions (qualitatively). We also compare CMC's and Parlasur's agendas in order to identify eventual superposition or coincidence of issues. Conclusions point out to a systematic lack of consideration of parliamentary initiatives which aim at keeping the monopole of Executive Powers in the regional arena. CMC only "acknowledges receipt" of the great majority of recommendations sent by Parlasur and has approved less than 5% of them. There is a very weak match of issues between the agendas of both organs, showing that topics discussed by Parlasur are rarely transformed into Mercosur rules. Results confirm the lack of influence of actors other than Executive Powers in the decision-making of Mercosur. The article points out the mechanisms that have been used to prevent the legislative branch to be considered in regional decisions. If members of Parliament are aware of them, they may press executive organs to formulate better responses, which may engender a different role for parliaments in foreign policy matters.