Evolutionary Game and Strategy Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction in Supply Chain Based on System Dynamic Model

Abstract

At the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly, China proposed the ambitious goal of achieving carbon peaking by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. To investigate the impact of emission reduction behaviors of upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain, this paper focuses on the influencing factors of the supply chain enterprises’ emission reduction decision-making. The study aims to explore the emission reduction behaviors of these enterprises in the context of China’s carbon trading market. Using the theory of system dynamics, an evolutionary game model was developed and simulated using AnyLogic software. The simulation analyzed the effects of carbon price, subsidies, and punishment strategies on the emission reduction decisions of supply chain enterprises, providing insights into their behavioral impact. The results demonstrate that punishment, subsidy intensity, and carbon price changes all influence the emission reduction decisions of upstream and downstream enterprises. Suppliers are more sensitive to carbon price, while manufacturers are more sensitive to subsidy intensity. Additionally, the closer the equilibrium carbon price, subsidy, and market are, the shorter the time for the emission reduction probability of both enterprises to stabilize. Therefore, it is recommended that supply chain companies increase their awareness of environmental responsibility and enthusiasm for green innovation, actively respond to the carbon trading system, improve their internal subsidy system, and promote green technology innovation.