The Supervision Mechanism of Residents’ Waste Separation Behavior: Analysis Using a Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

Abstract

To promote residents’ waste separation behavior, waste separation supervision has been a crucial need. This paper aims to explore the supervision mechanism of residents’ waste separation behavior using a tripartite evolutionary game model. The evolutionary stability conditions of resident, property service enterprise, and the government were analyzed. The influences of the main parameters on the strategy of three stakeholders were explored through numerical simulation. The results show that the regulatory mechanism of waste separation will reach the optimal stable strategy when the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the penalty for nonclassification is higher than the difference between classification cost and the total benefit of classification; (2) the subsidy to property services enterprise is greater than the total cost of positive participation management. Residents’ behaviors are mainly influenced by rewards and punishments. The behavioral strategies of property service companies are more sensitive to subsidies than penalties. In the early stage of mandatory waste separation, it is important to reduce the cost of residents’ separation, develop the publics’ environmental awareness, and increase the willingness of properties to participate in management. This paper presents a new perspective and theoretical guidelines for the local government and communities to supervise residents’ waste separation behaviors in China and other developing countries and offers useful insights into waste separation management for other countries.