Lowest Common Denominator: Explaining Multilateral Bargaining Over Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Regulation

Abstract

Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) have the potential to dramatically alter modern warfare and reshape global power differentials. Despite the strong rationale for negotiating global rules, consensus on whether and how to regulate LAWS has yet to be reached. This article explains multilateral bargaining over global LAWS regulation. Theoretically, it draws on rational choice institutionalism to develop an argument about the temporal dynamics of the negotiations over LAWS regulation. I emphasize the role of great power preferences and coalition formation in impeding preference convergence. Empirically, it focuses on the principal forum discussing LAWS regulation—the Group on Governmental Experts (GGE) under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)—and uses a novel dataset, complemented with text analysis methods to test the theoretical framework. The findings are threefold. First, several great powers consistently oppose new regulations on LAWS, distinguishing them from most other negotiating parties advocating for stricter rules. Second, weaker states turn to coalition formation as a strategy to augment their power. Third, these two factors jointly hinder the concession-convergence dynamic typically expected under consensus decision rules. This article has implications for debates on the regulation of LAWS, arms control negotiations, and the global governance of AI.