OIL RENTS, INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY

Abstract

This paper investigates the determinants of total factor productivity (tfp) using a panel data model involving 15 petroleum exporting countries during the period 2008-2019. The econometric evidence, based on the Arellano-Bond generalized method of moments, shows that: 1) education raises tfp, which suggests that highly qualified workers are more able to develop new technologies and absorb existing technologies, 2) oil rents lower tfp, which is consistent with the natural resource curse (nrc) hypothesis and, therefore, with the view that rent-seeking and corruption prevent some oil-rich nations from prospering, and 3) the interaction term involving oil rents and institutional development yields a positive effect on tfp, which means that imposing the rule of law, eradicating corruption, and improving regulatory quality can effectively contribute to reversing the negative effect of oil abundance on tfp.