The Reputational Basis of Public Accountability

Abstract

This article proposes a reputation-based approach to account for two core puzzles of accountability. The first is the misfit between behavioral predictions of the hegemonic political science framework for talking about accountability, namely, principal-agent, and empirical findings. The second puzzle is the unrivaled popularity of accountability, given evidence that supposedly accountability-enhancing measures often lead to opposite effects. A "reputation-informed" theoretical approach to public accountability suggests that accountability is not about reducing informational asymmetries, containing "drift," or ensuring that agents stay committed to the terms of their mandate. Accountability-in terms of both holding and giving-is about managing and cultivating one's reputation vis-à-vis different audiences. It is about being seen as a reputable actor in the eyes of one's audience(s), conveying the impression of competently performing one's (accountability) roles, thereby generating reputational benefits.