Dynamics of Trust and Mistrust in the Afghanistan–Pakistan Relationship

Abstract

Following its independence from Britain in 1947, Pakistan inherited territorial disputes with Afghanistan and India. The conflicts over the Durand Line demarcation and Pashtunistan became guiding factors in Afghanistan’s opposition to Pakistan’s membership of the United Nations. Since then, relations have been more conflictual than cooperative. The nature of the bilateral relationship has been overshadowed by mutual mistrust, despite the two nations’ cultural links and Pakistan being home to the world’s largest number of Afghan refugees. This article employs trust theory to explain why the two states continue to have less cooperative, more conflictual relations. Based on the analysis, this paper accepts that bilateral interactions between the two states are dominated more by the long legacy of mistrust than by a perceived need for cooperation, but argues that they act more “rationally” when they interact with each other in negotiations involving other countries (e.g., trustworthy hegemons), whether in connection with trade or security matters. This article argues that the manifestations of strategic trust in multi-party negotiations are largely due to the fear of losing enormous economic and geopolitical benefits from other actors, such as China and India, in case of non-cooperation.