Initiatives within representative government: Political competition and initiative use in the American states

Abstract

Why are statewide ballot initiatives used more frequently in some states relative to others? Using Gerber as a theoretical baseline, I argue that groups use initiatives in response to conditions surrounding representative government. Specifically, I argue that groups are best able to mobilize the resources necessary (i.e., citizens) to draft, qualify for the ballot, and pass an initiative when conditions surrounding representative government render it incapable of addressing citizens' policy preferences efficiently and effectively. Groups, that is, are best able to mobilize the resources necessary to pass initiatives as legislatures become insulated from citizens, or ineffective at digesting policy items. I extend the literature in this vein by finding strong evidence that initiatives are used in response to partisan conditions, which undermine legislatures' capacity to process legislation effectively. However, I find only limited empirical support for the argument that initiatives are used in response to legislative insulation. © The Author(s) 2013.