The abolition of fines and fees

Abstract

Advocating the abolition of a criminal justice policy has the advantages of being straightforward, coherent, and easy to understand. And, particularly for a policy that has largely gone unchallenged, such a position is likely to attract attention and discussion about the underlying assumptions of the policy. Such a simple, straightforward approach is appropriate if the following conditions are met: (a) the policy causes great harm, (b) the harm is inherent in the policy (i.e., is not a result of inefficient or ineffective administration), (c) alternative changes will not remedy the problems, and (d) the likely effects of the abolition are not worse than the current conditions. In the absence of those conditions, however, advocating abolition is likely to be perceived as overly simplistic, politically unrealistic, and perhaps unhelpful if it detracts from debate over substantive issues. In this essay, I examine the arguments made by Beckett and Harris (2011, this issue) for abolishing fees and fines. I suggest that, although problems exist with these economic sanctions, these problems are not as severe as Beckett and Harris assert and they are not inherent in monetary sanctions. I also suggest that Beckett and Harris's limits on their proposal (i.e., not abolishing restitution) do not solve the problems they raise about economic sanctions more generally. I then suggest less drastic alternatives that might be considered as options for dealing with some problems that Beckett and Harris point out. Finally, I suggest that abolishing these economic sanctions, particularly fines, is problematic because it would reduce the ability of judges to impose intermediate sanctions.