Strategic Autonomy and India’s Hedging Policies in the Indo-Pacific

Abstract

Hedging is a collection of tactics that includes bandwagoning, limited resistance and involvement. Put another way, it is an insurance position between the two simple tactics of balancing and bandwagoning. Many states, including India, have adopted hedging as a favoured approach since the end of the Cold War. In light of the US–China rivalry and shifting great power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, India continues to pursue a ‘hedging the bets’ strategy, despite the country and the United States enjoying stronger strategic ties—particularly through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. This article argues that as a rising power with its own ambitions to carve out a strategic space, India’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific seeks to retain a free, open and inclusive regional order. In the short and medium terms, this means forming soft-balancing coalitions and limited hard-balancing relationships with the United States. Strategic hedging still dominates Indian strategy in a broad sense. Forming an alliance with Washington will alienate China and Russia, the two great powers India is attempting not to dissociate completely. India’s somewhat neutral position on the Russian war on Ukraine and reluctance to join active military alliances in the Indo-Pacific indicates that hedging has value for maintaining India’s strategic autonomy and aspirations for great power status in the twenty-first century. India’s continued engagement through institutions such as BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and G20 as well as increased trade with China and Russia suggest the pursuit of a hedging strategy in its relations with other great powers.