We propose a general transformation that maps a cryptographic protocol that is secure in an extremely weak sense (essentially in a model where no adversary is present) into a protocol that is secure against a fully active adversary which interacts with an unbounded number of protocol sessions, and has absolute control over the network. The transformation works for arbitrary protocols with any number of participants, written with usual cryptographic primitives. Our transformation provably preserves a large class of security properties that contains secrecy and authenticity. An important byproduct contribution of this paper is a modular protocol development paradigm where designers focus their effort on an extremely simple execution setting - security in more complex settings being ensured by our generic transformation. Conceptually, the transformation is very simple, and has a clean, well motivated design. Each message is tied to the session for which it is intended via digital signatures and on-the-fly generated session identifiers, and prevents replay attacks by encrypting the messages under the recipient's public key. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.
CITATION STYLE
Cortier, V., Warinschi, B., & Zǎlinescu, E. (2007). Synthesizing secure protocols. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4734 LNCS, pp. 406–421). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74835-9_27
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.