Dynamics of Constitutional Asymmetry in Indian Federalism

Abstract

This article addresses the differential “federal dynamics” implied by the idea and practice of asymmetry in Indian federalism by examining the particular cases of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (NCTD) under Article 239AA, Nagaland under Article 371A and the hill areas of Manipur under Article 371C. Drawing on extant literature on “federal dynamics” that posits a distinctive authority relationship between different territorial units within federations, we contend that the “frictions and tensions” inherent in the three cases stem from overlapping and contending interpretations of the sources and the extent of powers assigned to each constituent unit. We emphasize how competitive populism and inter-party competition between the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Aam Aadmi Party in the NCTD, and intra-party factional contests in Manipur since May 2015 and February 2017, respectively, use “frictions and tensions” in ways that underline the “misfit” between federal institutions and the centralizing idea of ruling parties. We contend that this, and the ability to forge inter-party deliberation and a consultative mechanism in Nagaland mitigate and offset violent conflicts in multilevel federal interactions, and reinforces the imperative to underscore the mutually reinforcing relationship between federalism and democracy in India and beyond.