We consider a collective choice problem in which the number of alternatives and the number of voters vary. Two fundamental axioms of consistency in such a setting, reinforcement and composition-consistency, are incompatible. We first observe that the latter implies four conditions each of which can be formulated as a consistency axiom on its own right. We find that two of these conditions are compatible with reinforcement. In fact, one of these, called composition-consistency with respect to non-clone winners, turns out to characterize a class of scoring rules which contains the Plurality rule. When combined with a requirement of monotonicity, composition-consistency with respect to non-clone winners uniquely characterizes the Plurality rule. A second implication of composition-consistency leads to a class of scoring rules that always select a Plurality winner when combined with monotonicity.
CITATION STYLE
Öztürk, Z. E. (2020). Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency. International Journal of Game Theory, 49(3), 801–831. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00711-7
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