Spoofing attack and surveillance game in geo-location database driven spectrum sharing

Abstract

The geo-location database (GDB) driven is the enforcement method for dynamic spectrum sharing in TV White Space and 3.5 GHz spectrum bands, as well as, a preferred option for the other spectrum sharing applications. Although providing accurate and reliable spectrum information services, the GDB driven spectrum sharing suffers from a critical security threat of spoofing attack. Under a spoofing attack, an adversary could spoof either the identification (ID) or the location information in its request messages. This breaks the fairness and reduces the efficiency of the GDB driven spectrum sharing system. To counteract the location and ID spoofing attacks, the authors consider the location verification of request messages and the ID verification of communicating data. Since a resource manager and an adversary are independent and self-interested, they formulate two corresponding surveillance games to analyse the conflict interaction between the spoofing attack and the countermeasures. By expressing the surveillance game on requests' location in a strategic form and representing the surveillance game on data ID in a sequence form, they find out Nash equilibrium. The analytical and numerical results show that a resource manager can mitigate the spoofing attack by adequately adapting its penalty policy and surveillance strategy.