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Managerial style in cost asymmetry and shareholder value

Managerial and Decision Economics (2020) 41(5) 800-826
DOI: 10.1002/mde.3139
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Abstract

We show that CEOs' contribution to SG&A cost asymmetry is associated with lower shareholder value. CEO-related excess SG&A cost stickiness of CEOs with compensation less tied to shareholder value creation and high power drive this association. Last, we provide first evidence that cost asymmetry incorporates a harmful element to the firm and shareholders, namely CEO-related excess SG&A cost asymmetry.

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Lopatta, K., Kaspereit, T., & Gastone, L. M. (2020). Managerial style in cost asymmetry and shareholder value. Managerial and Decision Economics, 41(5), 800–826. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3139

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