Moral disengagement and attribution of blame: Convergences and divergences in the study of moral cognition

Abstract

The study of moral cognition is marked by two traditions: one centered on the study of how information regarding causality and intentionality is processed, and the other, derived from socio-cognitive potions, privileging moral agency and behavior regulation beyond processing. Thus, there seems to be a gap between the study of reasoning and the study of conduct, when speaking of morals. The article proposes an interaction between a path model of blame, centered on the processing of information, and moral disengagement (MD) as a set of justifications of immoral conduct. While the integration is not complete, it does contribute a view of moral cognition focused on social regulation and the interactions between the judgments and responses evident in social interactions. Additionally, as a product of that interaction, the study provides a methodological proposal to inquire into the origin of MD in development.