Journal Article

I—Alex Byrne: Transparency, Belief, Intention

  • Byrne A
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume (2011) 85(1) 201-221
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00203.x
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Abstract

This paper elaborates and defends a familiar 'transparent' account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one's intentions.

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Byrne, A. (2011). I—Alex Byrne: Transparency, Belief, Intention. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 85(1), 201–221. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00203.x

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