Are Bankers “Crying Wolf”? Type I, Type II Errors and Deterrence in Anti-Money Laundering: The Italian Case

Abstract

Excessive and useless reporting, called the “crying wolf effect,” is a crucial shortcoming that any anti-money laundering (AML) design aims to address. For this reason, in recent years, AML policies in both the US and Europe have switched from a rule-based to a risk-based approach. This study theoretically and empirically investigates whether the risk-based approach delivers the expected results. The theoretical model shows that a trade-off can emerge between accuracy (fewer type-I and type-II errors) and deterrence. The empirical analysis, conducted after the risk-based approach was introduced in Italy, confirms this trade-off. More specifically, deterrence seems a priority, whereas accuracy is sacrificed. In this respect, the data suggest that Italian bankers are likely to “cry wolf.”